Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2017  with  funding  from 

University  of  Illinois  Urbana-Champaign  Alternates 


https://archive.org/details/replytohonwilliaOOcart 


A 


REPLY 

T O 

HON.  WILLIAM  THOMAS’ 

EXPOSITION  AND  DEFENSE 


OF  THE 


FUGITIVE  SLAVE  LAW; 


BY  WILLIAM  CARTER. 


WINCHESTER,  ILLS: 

Printed  at  Hie  office  of  the  “Western  Unionist.” 

tp*  »»  , E r » * s . 

18  51. 


,'Cfi  ■ ■ F,  '."'■  V *; » ■' 


-r  i v'*  V f 

....  < • i 


I 


. ‘ : 


*,*.#>  • i '■•  ***  ■ 


> 

• Wi!  • : > > iu-  ' • ' 


■ • t * <-■ 


REPLY. 


Jn  his  Exposition  and  Defence  of  the  Fu- 
gitive Slave  Law,  Mr.  Thomas  has  shown 
himself  to  be  a well  read  lawyer.  Had  lie 
been  as  well  versed  in  Moral  science  as  in 
legal  statutes,  he  would  not  have  published 
the  doctrine  that  a man  is  bound  to  obey  an 
immoral  la-w  or  quit  the  country:  that  in 
case  of  conflict  between  human  and  divine 
law,  the  only  alternative  to  obedience  to  the 
former,  is  expatriation.  Let  us  examine 
this  doctrine. 

Mr.  T.  says  “he  does  not  contest  the 
proposition  that  man  is  not  bound  to  obey 
God  rather  than  man.’’  Of  course  he  could 
not  and  believe  the  Bible,  for  the  proposi- 
tion is  there  affirmed  in  express  terms. — 
Ha  finds  difficulty,  however,  in  seeing  who 
is  to  determine  whether  there  is  a conflict 
of  laws.  Of  course  every  man  is  to  decide 
for  himself,  on  his  responsibility  to  God  on 
the  one  hand,  and  under  liability  to  civil 
penally  on  the  other.  Acting  between 
these  two  forces,  the  principle  never  has 
worked  harm  and  never  will.  Indeed  Mr. 
T.  shows  the  absurdity  of  there  being  any 
other  Earthly  tribunal.  The  ultimate  de- 
cision must  be  in  the  court  of  Heaven  to 
which  the  appeal  is  taken. 

But  what  authority  has  Mr.  T.  for  his 
posittion  that  a man  must  either  submit  to 
an  immoral  law  or  expatriate  himself? — 
Blackstone  lays  down  the  doctrine  that  “if 
any  human  law  should  allow  or  enjoin  us 
to  commit  it  [what  the  divin^law  forbids] 
we  are  bound  to  transgress  thatnuman  law.  ” 
But  he  does  not  say  we  are  also  bound  to 
quit  the  country. 

When  Daniel  violated  the  law  forbidding 
him  to  pray  to  his  God,  he  did  very  wrong, 
according  to  Mr,  T.,  he  ought  either  to 
have  obeyed  or  quit  the  country.  But  when 
Jehovah  shut  the  lions'  mouths,  it  looks  ve- 
ry much  as  if  he  approved  both  of  his  dis- 
obedience, and  his  staying  in  the  country. 
So,  according  to  Mr.  T.,  the  three  children 
of  Israel  did  very  wrong  to  stay  in  the 
country,  and  yet  refuse  to  bow  down  to 
Nebuchadnezzar’s  golden  image,  But  God 
did  not  seem  so  to  regard  it  when  he  saved 
them  from  the  fiery  furnace.  And  equally 
culpable,  according  to  Mr.  T.’s  doctrine, 


were  the  Apostles  in  staying  in  the  country, 
and  yet  refusiug  to  obey  the  command  of 
the  Sanhedreim,  not  to  preach  in  the  name 
of  Jesus.  But  it  so  happens  that  we  have 
a formal  decision  in  this  case.  After  they 
had  been  forbidden,  and  imprisoned  for  dis- 
obedience, the  angel  of  the  Lord  led  them 
out  of  the  prison,  and  commanded  them 
both  to  stay  in  the  country,  and  disobey 
their  rulers.  Said  he:  “go  and  speak  in 
the  temple,  all  the  words  of  this  life.”— 
Acts  5:  20.  Divine  authority,  then,  is 
against  Mr.  T.’s  position. 

Mr.  T.’s  doctrine  makes  Judas  Iscariot, 
the  only  true  patriot  and  Christian.  The 
highest  authority  in  the  Jewish  nation  had 
issued  a command  that  if  any  man  knew 
where  Jesus  was,  he  should  show  it,  that 
they  might  arrest  him.  There  were  twelve 
men  to  whom  this  command  was  especial- 
ly applicable,  for  they  knew  where  he  was. 
None  of  them,  it  would  seem,  thought  of 
quitting  the  country  in  the  dilemma.  Elev- 
en of  them  were  your  hot  headed,  fanatical 
rebels,  who  held  the  higher  law  doctrine  and 
followed  that.  But  one  of  them  had  the 
genuine  patriotism  of  the  modern  type,  and 
obeyed  the  powers  that  be.  True,  it  might 
seem  to  mar  his  patriotism  and  his  piety, 
that  he  received  a reward  for  the  deed.— 
But  upon  reflection  it  seemed  to  him  enough 
to  have  done  such  a deed  without  q reward 
and  he  comes  back  and  casts  it  at  his  em- 
ployers’ feet. 

Did  Mr.  T.  never  read  the  history  of  the 
Puritans?  Is  ho  aware  that  Hume  says, 
“the  precious  spark  of  liberty  had  been 
kindled  by  the  Puritans  alone?’’  that  to 
them  “the  English  owe  the  whole  freedom 
of  their  Constitution?”  that  Lord  Brough- 
ham  says  of  them,  “they  obtained  for  Eng- 
land the  free  Constitution  she  enjoys?” — 
And  that  the  peculiarity  of  the  Puritans 
was  that  they  would  obey  God  rather  than 
man?  and  those  of  them  who  wrought  out 
for  England  her  free  Constitution,  stayed  in 
that  country?  aod  that  a portion  of  them 
came  to  America,  and  here  plantod  a lib- 
erty tree  whose  branches  now  dip  into  the 
Atlantic  and  Pacific?  and  that  Mr.  T.  is 
now  sitting  under  its  shade,  and  eating  us 


4 


fruit,  and  yet  saying  to  all  those  who  have 
a spark  of  the  Puritan  spirit,  you  must  quit 
the  country? 

But  what  is  Mr.  T.’s  strong  argument 
against  peaceful  non-conformity  to  a law 
which  a man  cannot  conscientiously  obey, 
vvhile  he  submits  to  its  penalty?  The  con- 
sequences! Revolution!  “Is  it  not  obvious,” 
he  asks,  “that  such  a course  would  result 
in  revolution?”  No,  and  it  is  marvellous 
that  Mr.  T.  does  not  see  that  it  would  re- 
sult neither  in  revolution,  nor  any  other 
direful  calamity.  “Why,”  says  he,  “sup- 
pose three  fourths  of  the  inhabitants  should 
assume  this  position,  who  will  execute  the 
penalties?”  Nobody,  1 presume;  the  law 
would  become  a dead  letter,  as  it  ought  to 
be,  and  be  repealed  in  due  time.  Suppose 
Congress  should  pass  a law  requiring  ev- 
ery person  uot  to  read  his  Bible  but  to  burn 
it,  on  penalty  of  six  months  imprisonment. 

I should  hope  more  than  three  fourths 
would  disobey  on  conscientious  grounds. — 
Who  then  would  execute  the  penalty?  No- 
body, it  might  be.  But  is  not  this  revolu- 
tion, overthrow  of  government,  anarchy  and 
confusion  dire?  No,  the  law  would  be  a 
dead  letter  like  our  State  law  forbidding 
the  circulation  of  foreign  bills  less  than  five 
dollars.  And  though  this  law  is  disregar- 
ded for  convenience  and  not  for  conscience 
sake,  1 have  never  heard  of  a revolution  or 
a shock  to  government,  in  consequence. — 
We  have  a case  on  record  in  point.  King 
Saul  once  commanded  his  people  when  iu 
pursuit  of  the  enemy,  not  to  take  food  un- 
til night.  Jonathan  not  knowing  the  com- 
mand, ate  of  a honey  comb  which  he  found 
in  the  way,  for  which  Saul  ordered  him  to 
be  put  to  death.  Nobody  would  execute 
the  penalty.  What  was  the  result?  Rev- 
olution? Not  at  all.  Saul  roigned  as  be- 
fore, and  was  more  careful  what  laws  he 
made  next  time. 

But  suppose  a war,  say3  Mr.  T.,  in  I 
which  the  people  should  take  the  same  | 
ground.  Very  well, ^suppose  our  govern- ( 
ment  should  declare  war  upon  Canada! 
for  the  avowed  purpose  ol  making  it  a; 
slave  State,  and  three-fourths  of  our  I 
people  should  believe  it  to  be  morally  j 
wrong  and  refuse  to  have  part  or  lot  in] 


| it?  What  would  be  the  result?  The 
best  possible.  Tne  war  would  fail,  and 
Congress  would  learn  wisdom  for  the 
future.  But  suppose  Congress  right  and 
the  people  wrong.  Suppose  three- 
fourths  ol  the  people  were  Mahometans, 
and  Congress  should  require  every  wit- 
ness to  swear  by  the  Bible.  What  the 
result?  Not  revolution,  but  wisdom  on 
the  part  of  Congress  not  to  enact  laws 
in  conflict  with  people’s  consciences. — 
Does  he  not  know  how  futile  is  aiaw  a- 
gainst  the  conscience  of  a people?  ' 

But  says  Mr.  T.,  this  doctrine  “is  no 
more  nor  less  than  saying  that  a man 
may  rightfully  violate  the  law  by  burn- 
ing a house  or  stealing  a horse,  if  when 
detected,  he  does  not  resist  punishment.” 
Not  rightfully,  unless  the  act  is  right. 
No  one  can  rightfully  refuse  obedience 
to  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law,  unless  it  is 
right  in  the  sight  of  God  so  to  do.  But 
what  great  harm  to  the  community 
would  grow  out  of  it,  should  a thief  or 
house-burner  profess  to  be  conscientious 
in  hi?  vocation.  The  penalty  would  be 
inflicted  just  the  same.  As  a matter  of 
fact,  no  one  would  be  likely  to  pursue 
the  vocation  long  from  conscientious 
motives. 

The  history  of  the  world  shows  the 
danger  is  not  that  men  will  subject  them  • 
selves  to  civj^  penalties  from  conscien- 
tious motives,  but  the  whole  danger  is 
that  they  will  obey  wicked  laws  rather 
than  incur  their  penalty.  Witness  Dan- 
iel and  the  three  children  of  Israel. — 
With  the  exception  of  these,  the  whole 
nation  bowed  to  the  impious  laws  of 
of  their  monarchs. 

Is  there  any  inherent  reason  in  Mr. 
T’s,  position?  if  human  government  en- 
acts a law  contrary  to  the  law  of  God, 
he  admits  that  we  have  no  right  to  obey* 
it.  How  then  can  that  wrong  act  of 
government  work  a forfeiture  of  my 
right  to  remain  in  my  native  land?  If 
our  government  commands  me  to  blas- 
pheme my  Maker,  reason  and  common 

% 


sense  decide  that  I am  neither  bound  to 
obey  nor  quit  the  country,  especially 
when  the  government  does  not  impose 
exile.  And  the  wonder  is  that  Mr.  T. 
should  have  propounded  the  contrary 
doctrine. 

Mr.  T.  is  pleased  to  say  that  if  there 
had  been  no  political  objects  to  attain 
by  agitation,  it  is  not  probable  that  any 
occupants  of  pulpits  would  have  been 
made  to  believe  that  their  rights  of  con- 
science were  in  'any  wise  interfered 
with  by  any  of  the  provisions  of  this 
Fugitive  Slave  Law,  Does  he  not  see 
how  easy  it  would  be  to  retort  that  but 
for  political  objects,  it  is  not  probable  he 
would  ever  have  been  made  to  believe 
the  doctrine  he  has  promuiged?  I have 
no  doubt  the  latter  is  just  as  true  as  the 
former,  but  1 will  not  make  it  because 
of  its  intrinsic  impropriety  which  no 
man  is  more  likely  on  reflection  to  see 
than  Judge  Thomas. 

The  Fugitive  Slave  Law  commands  all 
good  citizens  to  aid  and  assist  in  the  prompt 
and  efficient  execution  of  the  law,  whenever 
their  services  may  be  required  by  the  mar- 
shal. Very  many  people  believe  they  arG 
thus  commandeid  to  do  what  is  contrary  to 
the  Divine  law;  that  it  is  a palpable  viola- 
tion of  the  Golden  Rule;  that  if  they  or  their 
fathers  had  been  kidnapped  into  slavery, 
they  couid  not  think  it  wrong  for  them  to 
runaway,  nor  right  for  others  to  force  them 
back,  and  that  no  law  commanding  thereto 
aid  and  assist  in  forcing  back  the  fugitive 
from  bondage,  could  make  it  right  so  to  do. 
Judge  Thomas  does  not  deny  that  this  Fu- 
gitive Slave  Law  commands  us  to  do  what 
is  contrary  to  the  law  of  God. 

I do  not  understand  the  Constitution  to 
require  private  citizens  to  aid  and  assist  in 
returning  fugitive  slaves;  nor  do  I under- 
stand that  the  law  of ’93  required  it.  Nor 
do  I understand  Judge  T.  to  affirm  it  of 
either.  But  l understand  him  to  maintain 
that  there  isa3  much  reason  why  good  citi- 
zens should  aid  in  executing  the  law  in  ref- 


erence to  fugitive  slaves,  as  in  reference  to 
fugitive  apprentices  or  fugitives  from  jus- 
tico.  From  the  legal  stand-point  where 
the  Judge  looks  at  them,  it  may  seem  the 
same.  But  from  the  moral  stand-point,  the 
difference  is  as  wide  as  the  poles.  In  the 
one  case  we  are  called  on  to  do  what  is  right , 
in  the  other  what  is  wrong  in  the  sight  of 
God.  This  fugitive  slave  bill,  so  far  as  l 
know,  is  the  first  ever  passed  by  Congress 
commanding  all  good  citizens  to  do  what 
the  Divine  law  forbids.  But  if  the  law  of 
’93  or  even  the  Constitution  enjoined  what 
conflicts  with  the  law  of  God,  we  are  bound 
not  to  obey. 

But  Judge  T.  endeavors  to  show  that 
citizens  in  aiding  to  execute  wicked  laws, 
do  not  participate  in  the  wrong.  He  sup- 
poses a case  in  which  the  judge  or  sheriffis 
satisfied  that  a man  is  convicted  of  felony 
upon  false  testimony.  Does  the  Judge,  he 
asks,  by  pronouncing  sentence,  or  the  sher- 
iff by  conveying  the  man  to  the  penitentia- 
ry, become  guilty  of  perjury  or  false  im- 
prisonment? There  might  be  a difference 
of  opinion  in  that  case.  But  some  would 
say,  no.  Why?  Because,  they  would  say, 
whan  a man  is  tried  for  felony,  it  belongs  to 
the  jury  and  to  nobody  else,  to  decide  upon 
the  testimony.  But  when  the  question  is, 
does  a law  conflict  with  the  law  of  God,  it 
belongs  to  every  body  to  decide  for  himself, 
and  to  act  in  accordance  with  that  decision. 
If  a law  commands  idolatry,  every  man  is 
bound  to  decide  for  himself  whether  or  not 
it  is  a violation  of  God's  law.  No  decision 
of  courts  or  juries  can  exonerate  him  from 
the  obligation  to  judge  for  himself  and  act 
for  himself.  And  so  every  man’s  conscience 
decides.  There  is  no  difference  of  opinion 
on  this  point.  Cannot  Mr.  T.  see  that 
there  is  a radical  difference  between  a de- 
fect in  the  operation  of  a righteous  and  bo- 


6 


nevolent  law  which  punishes  the  felon,  and 
a wicked  law  which  contravenes  the  law  of 
God.  Suppose  a man  is  to  be  burned  at 
the  stake  for  refusing  obedience  to  the  law 
commanding  idolatry.  Does  not  Mr.  T. 
think  that  every  man  who  aids  in  executing 
that  law,  even  the  man  who  binds  the 
chains,  or  piles  the  faggots,  or  applies  the 
torch,  is  guilty  in  the  sight  of  God  of  the 
iniquity  of  that  law?  Does  not  every  man's 
conscience  decide  that  every  one  who  aids 
in  sustaining  and  executing  that  impious 
law,  whether  commanded  or  not,  partakes 
of  its  guilt?  because  it  was  a case  in  which 
he  was  bound  to  know  whether  or  not  it  was 
contrary  to  the  law  of  God.  Dr.  E.  Beech- 
er, former  President  of  Illinois  College  has 
some  remarks  on  this  subject,  in  a late  ser- 
mon, a few  of  which  1 beg  to  introduce: 

“In  all  such  cases  the  law  of  responsi- 
bility is  this;  that  those  who  in  organic  re- 
lations perform  such  acts,  are  answerable 
as  individuals;  that  those  whom  they  repre- 
sent in  such  acts  are  also  individually  re- 
sponsible to  God  for  the  organic  sin  if  they 
uphold  and  perpetuate  such  action;  and  that 
they  are  responsible  in  a higher  sense  than 
for  any  other  kind  of  action.  No  matter 
how  long  such  laws  exist,  or  for  how  many 
generations  they  have  been  handed  down; 
every  man  and  every  generation  who  receives 
and  sustains  them  becomes  individually  re- 
sponsible . 

“That  this  is  the  real  law  of  responsibili- 
ty is  clear;  because  no  organic  sin  can  be 
committed  but  by  tho  voluntary  action  of 
individuals;  it  cannot  be  charged  upon  fate 
or  any  other  responsible  abst  raction  that 
has  no  soul;  and  because  the  conseque  nces 
of  the  action  of  individuals  are  never  so 
great  as  when  they  act  in  organic  relations; 
and  of  course  the  obligations  to  act  right 
are  never  so  high.  The  wide  extent  of 
their  consequences,  the  power  of  such  ex- 


ample, the  perversion  of  the  noblest  parts  of 
our  nature  (the  social  powers)  the  evil  edu- 
cation established,  the  force  of  temptation 
created,  show  this.  These  consequences  do 
not  terminate  with  the  actors.  The  malig- 
nant power  of  a sinful  law  extends  through 
the  social  sphere,  and  becomes  a fountain  of 
evil  whose  streams  widen  and  deepen  as  they 
flow  on,  until  the  imagination  is  overwhelm- 
ed with  their  extent.  The  example  of  or- 
ganic sin  has  greater  influence  in  destroy- 
ing tho  energy  of  conscience.  The  makers 
of  laws  and  the  directors  of  corporations, 
are  always  the  leading  men  of  the  commu- 
nity.” “For  what  then  should  a man  be 
responsible,  if  not  an  agency  in  creating 
such  instruments  of  corruption?  Sinful  leg- 
islation arrays  interest  and  prejudice  against 
truth  and  tends  to  make  men  indifferent  to 
principle,  and  even  to  abandon  the  right, 
through  fear  of  dishonor  or  loss.  Hence 
the  Word  of  God  represents  such  a corrupt 
organization  under  tho  form  of  a terrific 
beast,  and  asks, — “Who  is  like  unto  tho 
beast?  who  is  able  to  make  war  with  him?” 
And  its  power  of  temptation  is  represented 
as  being  extended  over  all  whose  names 
are  not  written  in  the  book  of  life,  by  the 
simple  process  of  exacting  from  them  some 
token  of  submission,  and  by  threatniug  non- 
intercourse in  trade,  and  even  death  to  those 
who  refuse  to  comply  with  the  wicked  law. 
What  a fearful  responsibility  rests  on  the 
authors  of  such  systems  of  temptation  by 
law  ! But  this  is  no  excuse  to  those  who 
yield  to  the  temptation,  obeying  man  more 
than  God,  for  we  readttthat  not  only  the 
beast  and  the  false  nrophet  were  cast  alive 
into  a lake  burning  with  fire  and  brimstone, 
but  all  who  should  worship  him  or  receive 
his  mark,  shall  share  the  same  fearful  desti- 
ny.” 

I have  now  shown,  I think,  that  men  are 
not  bound  to  quit  the  country  or  obey  a law’ 
which  is  in  conflict  with  the  Divine  law; 
that  disobedience  does  not  necessarily  lead 
to  revolution;  that  tho  Fugitive  Slave  Law 
commands  all  good  citizens  to  do  what  is 
contrary  to  the  Divine  law;  aud  that  in  aid- 
ing in  its  execution  they  incur  the  guilt  of 
disobeying  God.  If  Judge  Thomas  thinks 
my  reasoning  unsound,  1 hope  he  will  point 


• » 


7 


it  out  and  establish  his  own  positions  if  he 
can. 

As  his  constitutional  argument  doe9  not 
affect  the  duty  of  obedience  to  law,  I might 
here  stop;  but  inasmuch  as  it  is  as  baseless 
as  his  moral  argument,  1 suppose  it,  is  prop* 
per  to  expose  it. 

The  peculiarity  of  Judge  Thomas’  defense 
of  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law,  is,  that  he  lays 
the  Constitution  by  the  side  of  the  law,  and 
attempts  to  supply  the  defects  in  the  law, 
from  the  Constitution.  The  article  which 
he  uses  for  this  purpose,  is  the  following  : 
“In  all  criminal  prosecutions,  the  accused 
shall  enjoy  the  right  to  a speedy  and  public 
trial  b>  an  impartial  jury  of  the  state  and 
district  wherein  the  crime  shall  have  been 
committed,  which  district  shall  have  been 
previously  ascertained  by  law,  and  to  be  in- 
formed of  the  nature  and  cause  of  the  ac- 
cusation; to  be  confronted  withjjthe  witness- 
es against  him;  to  have  compulsory  process 
for  obtaining  witnesses  in  his  favor;  and  to 
have  the  assistance  of  counsel  for  his  de- 
fence.” From  this  he  infers  that  “when 
the  fugitive  is  arrested,  he  is  entitled  under 
the  Constitution  to  have  compulsory  process 
for  obtaining  witnesses  in  his  favor  and  to 
have  the  assistance  of  counsel  for  his  de- 
fence; and  the  right  to  make  affidavit  sta- 
ting the  names  and  residences  of  witnesses 
and  showing  their  materiality,  results  from 
the  right  to  have  compulsory  process.”  As 
to  the  right  of  trial  by  jury,  he  infers  that 
all  the  right  the  alleged  fugitive  has,  is  de- 
rived from  this  article  of  the  Constitution, 
and  this  expressly  locates  the  trial  in  the 
state  from  which  he  escaped,  and  therefore 
excludes  it  from  the  state  where  he  is  ar- 
rested. Now  all  this  is  very  plausible,  and 
would  be  very  conclusive,  but  for  one  de- 
fect. The  articleof  the Constititution  which 
he  thus  U3es,  has  no  more  applicability,  to 
the  alleged  fugitivejslave,  than  to  the  man  in 
the  moon.  That  article  begins  by  saying, 
“In  all  criminal  prosecutions”  &c.  The 
prosecution  of  a person  escaping  from  ser- 
vice is  not  a criminal  prosecution;  the  ques- 
tion, which  is  raised  and  tried  is  not  one  of 
crime,  but  of  property  \ the  question  is, 
does  the  man  own  himself  or  is  he  own- 
ed by  the  claimant?  The  language  ot 


the  Constitution  shows  this:  “he  shall 
be  delivered  up  on  claim  of  the  party  to 
whom  such  service  or  labor  may  be 
due.”  The  question  of  service  or  labor 
due,  is  one  of  property,  not  of  crime. — 
And  when  the  claimant  takes  him  back 
to  the  state  whence  he  escaped,  it  is 
not  to  afford  him  a jury  trial,  but  to  en- 
joy the  right  of  property  in  him,  which 
has  been  decided  without  a jury. 

Many  intelligent  persons  suppose 
that  the  alleged  fugitive  from  service, 
has  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  secured  to 
him  by  the  following  article  of  the  Con- 
stitution: uIn  suits  at  common  law, 
where  the  value  in  controversy  shall  ex- 
ceed twenty  dollars,  the  right  of  trial 
by  jury  shall  be  preserved.”  As  we 
have  seen,  the  question  in  respect  to  an 
alleged  fugitive  from  service,  is  one  of 
property.  “The  value  in  controversy 
exceeds  twenty  dollars,”  usually.  And 
the  right  of  trial  by  jury  secured  by  this 
article,  is  in  the  place  where  the  properly 
is  found.  If  this  article  applies  to  the 
question  of  property  in  the  alleged  fu- 
gitive, then  the  fugitive  slave  law  is  un- 
constitutional, for  it  deprives  him  of  this 
right. 

The  conclusion  then  to  which  we 
come,  is  that  neither  this  law  nor  the 
article  of  the  Constitution  which  Judge 
T.  quotes,  gives  to  the  alleged  fugitive 
slave,  the  light  to  have  compulsory  pro 
cess  for  obtaining  witnesses  in  his  favor, 
nor  to  have  the  assistance  of  counsel, 
nor  the  right  to  make  affidavit  for  pur- 
poses of  continuance,  or  securing  the  at- 
tendance of  witnesses,  nor  the  right  of 
trial  by  jury  either  where  he  is  arrested 
or  any  where  else.  The  bill  reported 
by  Mr.  Clay,  as  chairman  of  the  com- 
mittee of  thirteen  (a  part  of  the  omni- 
bus) did  provide  for  a jury  trial  in  £case 
the  alleged  fugitive  declared  himself 
free  in  the  presence  of  the  Court  or 
Commissioner  and  was  delivered  up. — 
The  claimant  was  put  under  a bond  of 
one  thousand  dollars,  to  take  the  alleged 


* 


fugitive  before  a court  of  cmpetent  ju- 
risdiction in  the  county  whence  he  fled, 
at  its  first  term,  and  then  and  there  per- 
mit a trial  by  jury  for  his  freedom,  and 
“afford  the  facilities  necessary  for  a *fair 
trial.”  But  the  present  law  scouts 
such  a provision. 

The  actual  state  of  things  is  this.  If 
a man  from  Texas  claims  my  horse,  I 
have  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  here. — 
But  if  he  claims  me  (and  the  law  makes 
no  distinction  of  color,)  this  law  debars 
me  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  here,  and  it 
gives  me  the  right  nowhere,  unless  it 
does  here  where  this  law  excludes  it.— 
The  false  testimony  of  three  men  (es- 
pecially if  I were  away  from  home  a- 
mong  strangers)*  might  procure  tfr 
summary  decision  of  the  Commissions 
in  entire  conformity  to  the  law,  which* 
would  send  me  to  Texan  bondage.— 
Judge  T.  says  1 would  be  no  worse  oft 
than  if  I were  sent  to  Texas  as  an  alleges 
fugitive  from  justice,  on  false  testimony,— 
That  is  not  so.  In  case  of  an  alleged  fugi- 
tive from  justice,  the  constitution  expressly 
provides  fora  speedy  trial  by  an  impartial 
jury  in  the  state  whence  he  fled.  But  it 
makes  no  such  provision  for  an  alleged  fugi- 
tive from  service, nor  will  Mr.T.  again  affirm 
it.  Here  is  where  the  law  leaves  me.  What 
now  can  Mr.  T.  say  in  defence  of  this  law? 
Nothing!  He  can  only  say  that  if  I am 
taken  to  Texas  (and  not  sold  half  adoz 
en  times  by  the  way)  and  if  Texas  has 
provided  a law  for  a jury  trial  in  such 
cases,  I may  avail  myself  of  that,  i£  I 
can;  and  if  she  has  not,  I may  try  and 
get  up  an  action  for  assault,  and  battery, 
or  false  imprisonment,  or  something  of 
that  kind.  And  that  is  all  he  can  say; 
unless  he  should  add,  as  he  seems  to  in- 
timate, that  if  the  Constitution  does  not 
grant  me  the  right  of  trial  by  jury,  1 
have  none;  that  the  Constitution  is  the 
only  source  of  such  right;  that  I can 
claim  nothing  from  natural  justice  any 
more  than  the  slaveholder  for  the  deliv- 
ery of  his  slave!  And  now  with  the 
utmost  respect  for  Judge  Thomas,  I beg 


leave  to  say  that  this  law,  which  he  has  un- 
dertaken to  defend,  is  a most  abominable  law, 
and  that  he  will  have  to  try  again  before  he 
makes  it  appear  otherwise.  It  allows  mono 
right  of  trial  by  jury  on  the  question 
whether!  own  myself  or  am  owned  by 
a southern  slaveholder;  from  the  decis* 
ion  of  an  irresponsible,  it  may  be  an  un- 
principled Commissioner  under  this  law, 
there  is  no  appeal;  that  decision  puts 
me  where  no  writ  of  habeas  corpus  can 
help  me.  I repeat.it  is  an  abominable  law. 

It  may  me  proper  to  say  that  1 have 
the  utmost  confidence  in  the  honesty 
and-christian  character  of  Judge  Thom- 
as; but  I will  not  say  of  him  that  I 
think  he  has  been  misled  or  imposed 
upon  by  wicked  or  designing  men  whose 
object  if  not  vocation  is  to  deceive,  and 
that  he  has  thus  been  led  to  make  those 
not  correctly  advised,  believe  lies,  as  he 
says  of  an  acquaintance;  for  it  does  not 
seem  to  me  it  would  be  decorous.  But 


I may  say  with  truth  and  propriety  that 
both  his  Constitutional  and  moral  argu- 
ments are  entirely  without  foundation, 
whether  any  body  is  misled  by  them  or 
not.  And  I hope  he[will  so  see  them.  If 
not,  I hope  he  will  show  us  their  foundatior. 

P.  S.  It  has  been  suggested  that  my 
reply  to  his  constitutional  argument  is 
not  consistent  with  my  first  remark, 
that  Judge  T’s  defence  shows  him  to  be 
a well  read  lawyer.  I should  not  only 
admit,  but  contend  that  he  is  such, 
whether  it  is  shown  by  his  Defence  or 
not.  But  I confess  that  when  I made 
that  remark  I was  not  aware  that  he 
had  fallen  into  such  an  error,  nor  did  I 
suppose  it  possible  he  should.  Such 
was  my  confidence  in  his  accuracy, 
that  I did  not  at  first  read  his  legal  ar- 
gument with  a critical  eye,  nor  did  I 
think  of  replying  to  it.  Yet  it  lies  on 
the  surface,  and  it  is  strange  that  any 
body  with  an  eye  half  open  should  not 
see  that  he  has  applied  an  article  of  the 
Constitution  relating  to  criminal  prose- 
cutions, to  the  case  of  a fugitive  from 
service  which  is  a question  ol  property* 


